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CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,  
AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT∗
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In his contribution to this symposium, Alex Tsesis addresses Con-
gressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment,1 responding to 
an article on the same subject by Jennifer Mason McAward.2  He ar-
gues, correctly, that the Republicans who passed the Civil Rights Act 
over President Andrew Johnson’s veto in 1866 intended for the 
second section of the Thirteenth Amendment to delegate broad pow-
er to Congress to secure the rights and privileges associated with free-
dom in the United States.3
Both arguments are addressed to Congress as well.  McAward 
tells congressmen and congresswomen that broad legislation to pro-
tect rights would be unconstitutional, while Tsesis tells Congress the 
opposite.
  Both essays are very much constitutional 
law essays.  They address the powers of Congress in terms of legal 
principles and arguments of the sort that ultimately would be pre-
sented to courts testing the constitutionality of the broad legislation 
the essays envision.   
4
 
Copyright © 2011 by Michael Les Benedict. 
  Bound by their oaths to support the Constitution, con-
gressmen and congresswomen should refrain from passing such legis-
lation if McAward is right; they are free to pass such legislation if Tse-
sis is right.  However, while many congressmen and congresswomen 
are lawyers, they are politicians first and foremost.  They no doubt see 
their jobs primarily to reflect the national interest and the interests of 
their constituents, not to make determinations of constitutional law.  
One should not be surprised that many congresspersons who favor 
∗ Professor Emeritus of History, The Ohio State University. 
 1. Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD. 
L. REV. 40 (2011). 
 2. Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement 
Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77 (2010). 
 3. Tsesis, supra note 1, at 43–45. 
 4. McAward, supra note 2, at 134–42 (“Moreover, the historical record does not indi-
cate that any of the framers of the Thirteenth Amendment contemplated, much less en-
dorsed, such an expansive view of Congress’s interpretive powers.”); Tsesis, supra note 1, at 
53–56.  
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such legislation might pass it on the understanding that it is ultimately 
the role of the Supreme Court of the United States to decide which 
legal argument is right, rather than theirs—especially when the Su-
preme Court appears to claim a monopoly on constitutional interpre-
tation.5
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
 
That the Supreme Court had such primacy in constitutional in-
terpretation was not the understanding of congressmen (and they 
were all congressmen) at the time they framed the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment and the 
Civil Rights Act of 18666 in a different constitutional world than the 
one Americans know today.  It was a world in which politics and polit-
ical choices were predominantly articulated in constitutional terms, 
with a powerful conviction that all actions of government must meet 
constitutional requirements.  There was no need for a House rule 
mandating that every legislative proposal expressly identify a source of 
constitutional authority; the manager of any bill that might raise con-
stitutional objections began by articulating its constitutional justifica-
tion.  Sometimes the constitutional arguments had been so well estab-
lished that congressmen did not think it necessary to follow this 
general rule.  However, as soon as an opponent raised a constitutional 
objection, proponents had to respond, and they did so at length.  As 
the late Professor David P. Currie observed, “virtually everything be-
came a constitutional question—from great controversies like those 
over the national bank and the president’s removal power to epheme-
ra of exquisite obscurity.”7  In scope, length, and number of subjects, 
throughout the nineteenth century—and certainly as the Thirteenth 
Amendment was framed—constitutional debates in Congress dwarfed 
the attention to issues of constitutional power in the Supreme Court.8  
American politics revolved around questions like the constitutionality 
of a national bank, a protective tariff, and of federal promotion of 
transportation, communications, and education.9
 
 5. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531–32, 535–36 (1997) (holding that Con-
gress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act). 
  Americans fought 
 6. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  
 7. David P. Currie, Prolegomena for a Sampler: Extrajudical Interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, 1789–1861, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 21 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whit-
tington eds., 2005).  
 8. Id. at 22–23. 
 9. For constitutional politics in the Early Republic and Jeffersonian Republican eras, 
see Michael Les Benedict, The Jeffersonian Republicans and Civil Liberty, in ESSAYS IN THE 
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over the malleability of citizenship and the constitutionality of the Se-
dition Act of 179810 and of nullification.11  The issue of state versus 
federal control of policy towards Native Americans roiled American 
politics as tendentiously as it did the Supreme Court;12 and so, of 
course, did the constitutional issues surrounding slavery.13
In none of these examples did a court ruling settle the issue.  Be-
fore the Civil War, the great constitutional issues were decided by the 
American people, not the Supreme Court.  The process was essential-
ly political, not legal—constitutional politics rather than constitution-
al law.  The arguments, often made by lawyers in Congress, bore a dis-
tinct resemblance to those they might make in court.  These 
arguments were aimed neither at judges nor fellow congressmen.  As 
congressional correspondent Noah Brooks observed, when a con-
gressman spoke, “only a scattered few” even remained in their seats.
   
14
 
HISTORY OF LIBERTY: SEAVER INSTITUTE LECTURES AT THE HUNTINGTON LIBRARY 23, 23–41 
(1988) (arguing that the political battles between Federalist Jeffersonian Republicans 
largely defined present-day conceptions of freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution) and 
H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS 137–46 (2002) (discussing Republican constitutional debates of the early 
1800s).  For constitutional politics in the Jacksonian Era, see Gerald Leonard, Party as a 
“Political Safeguard of Federalism”: Martin Van Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Poli-
tics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 268–76 (2001) (describing how party politics became institu-
tionalized in the Jacksonian Era).  See generally GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007) (analyzing 
the transformation of constitutional politics and theory during the Jacksonian Era).  
  
The speaker’s argument was “wasted” on the members, he explained, 
 10. The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798 enabled the government to punish dissent and 
criticism.  DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN UNION  1774–1804, at 101–67 (2009); POWELL, supra note 9, 
at 55–66; JUHANI RUDANKO, THE FORGING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: ESSAYS ON 
ARGUMENTATION IN CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ON THE 
SEDITION ACT 59–86 (2003). 
 11. Nullification was a constitutional theory maintaining that a state, as the sovereign 
political entity in the Union, could determine a federal law unconstitutional and “nullify” 
its operation within its borders.  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: 
DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829–1861, at 89–119 (2005).  See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE 
UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, STATES’ RIGHTS, AND THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS 
(1987); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 72–112 (1999). 
 12. See generally Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 
21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969); JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION 
OF LAW AND POLITICS (1996). 
 13. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE 
MAELSTROM, 1829–1861 (2005) (discussing the slavery issue in Congress from 1829 to 
1861).   
 14. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF 
SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 89 (2001) (quoting Letter of Castine, 
SACRAMENTO DAILY UNION, March 14, 1964, at 1).  “Castine” was Noah Brooks’s journalis-
tic nom de plume.   
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“for the speech is not intended for any special effect in the House or 
Senate, but upon the country.”  Used as campaign documents, or cir-
culated by the speaker to his constituents, “it flies all over the country, 
and has its small sum of influence upon the masses of the people.”15
Congressmen sent the daily records of Congress to local newspa-
per editors and constituents.  Carefully revised versions of speeches—
sometimes never actually presented on the floor—were published and 
republished in newspapers, printed in pamphlet form, and “broad-
cast” in congressmen’s districts or statewide as campaign documents.  
For example, Charles Sumner’s 1866 argument for the extension of 
equal civil and political rights to African-Americans
 
16 was quoted ex-
tensively in the Lowell (Mass.) Daily Citizen & News.17  The Citizen & 
News took its report from a longer one that it informed its readers 
“occupies over fourteen columns of the Boston Journal.”18  Sumner ar-
ranged to publish the same speech as a pamphlet entitled The Equal 
Rights of All.19  The eminent Republican leader James G. Blaine later 
told readers that Sumner’s speeches did not impress his colleagues.20  
Heard aloud, they were too much like “laborious essays,” Blaine ex-
plained.  But he acknowledged that circulated in print “they were the 
antislavery classics of the day.”  His arguments went “to the million” 
who made public opinion.21
Suffused by constitutional issues, nineteenth-century politics was 
different in character than politics has been during most of our time.  
For most of the twentieth century, jurisprudence distinguished poli-
tics from law.  The judicial branch of government set the boundaries 
within which the political branches of government could act.  Within 
those legal boundaries, the political branches were free to make un-
  
 
 15. Id. 
 16. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 670–87 (1866). 
 17. The Great Speech of Senator Charles Sumner, LOWELL (MASS.) DAILY CITIZEN & NEWS, 
Feb. 7, 1866.  
 18. Id. 
 19. CHARLES SUMNER, THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL: THE GREAT GUARANTEE AND 
PRESENT NECESSITY, FOR THE SAKE OF SECURITY, AND TO MAINTAIN A REPUBLICAN 
GOVERNMENT—SPEECH OF HON. CHARLES SUMNER, OF MASSACHUSETTS, IN THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE, FEBRUARY 6 AND 7, 1866 (1866).  Using only clippings collected from 
Sumner’s own papers, the editors of The Works of Charles Sumner reprinted reports and edi-
torial comments on Sumner’s speech from newspapers in fourteen cities, ranging from 
Belfast, Maine, to Dayton, Ohio.  Private correspondents from around the country told 
Sumner they had read it.  CHARLES SUMNER, 9 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 247–66 
(1870–1883). 
 20. JAMES G. BLAINE, 1 TWENTY YEARS IN CONGRESS, FROM LINCOLN TO GARFIELD 318 
(1884). 
 21. Id. 
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constrained policy choices.  Nineteenth-century Americans made no 
such distinction.   
Today many constitutional scholars again recognize that the dis-
tinction between politics and law is overstated.  American constitu-
tional policy is made through an essentially political process, which 
has been increasingly influenced by the courts and law,22 but not fi-
nally determined by either.  It is affected not only by the esoteric con-
stitutional jurisprudence of lawyers and judges, but also by popular 
constitutional convictions that both shape and are shaped by political 
debate.23
In the nineteenth century, politicians went to the people on the 
great constitutional issues of the times.  Every Democratic national 
platform from 1840 to 1856 began with the party creed, the first prin-
ciple of which was “[t]hat the Federal Government is one of limited 
powers, derived solely from the constitution [sic], and that grants of 
power therein ought to be strictly construed . . . .”
   
24
 
 22. JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND 
JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS 167 (1998).  John Dinan distinguished among three eras, 
or “regimes,” that provided differing means for the protection of rights—a “republican” 
regime that relied on the structure of government and the political process, a “populist” 
regime that introduced the initiative and the referendum as innovative procedures to pro-
tect popular rights, and finally a “judicialist” regime, emerging in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, which relied upon judicial review.  Dinan’s conclusions are uncongenial to current 
law-faculty dominated constitutional jurisprudence, and have gained little traction.  But 
they are consistent with other analyses that view ubiquitous judicial review as an artifact of 
the twentieth century.  See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 119, 119–41 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008). 
  As late as 1888, 
the Democratic platform reaffirmed that “[c]hief among the prin-
ciples of party faith are . . . devotion to a plan of government regu-
lated by a written Constitution, strictly specifying every granted power 
 23. Bruce Ackerman played a crucial role in breaking down the distinction between 
politics and constitutional law by proposing instances in which politics switched to a “high-
er track,” leading to what he called constitutional “transformations.”  See generally Bruce 
Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453 (1989) (arguing that 
the American people have sometimes in effect amended the Constitution through “higher 
track” constitutional politics rather than by the means specified in Article V of the Consti-
tution); BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000) (same).  Steven 
Griffin has proposed abandoning the distinction between constitutional law and politics 
entirely.  See STEVEN GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 
18 (1996).  See also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 
Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
4 (2003);  MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); 
WAYNE MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1996). 
 24. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840–1972, at 2, 3, 10, 16, 24 (Donald Bruce Johnson 
& Kirk H. Porter eds., 1973) [hereinafter NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS].   
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and expressly reserving to the States or people the entire ungranted 
residue of power.”25
Whigs, who advocated the use of federal power to promote eco-
nomic development, endorsed in their 1848 platform a Constitution 
“cherished in the affections because protective of the interests of the 
people,” to be construed by “wise and generous rules,” as advocated 
by George Washington.
 
26  All knew the Whigs meant to contrast Wash-
ington’s “wise and generous rules” to Democratic strict construction.27  
But Democratic state-rights federalism proved so attractive to Ameri-
can voters that by 1852 Whigs conceded in their platform that “all 
powers not granted or necessarily implied are expressly reserved to 
the States respectively and to the people” and that the state govern-
ments “should be held secure in their reserved rights.”28  Nonetheless, 
other articles endorsed a protective tariff, deemed unconstitutional by 
Democrats, and insisted that “[t]he Constitution vests in Congress the 
power to open and repair harbors, and remove obstructions from na-
vigable rivers, whenever such improvements are necessary for the 
common defence, and for the protection and facility of com-
merce . . . .”29  In contrast to the Democrats’ obsession with state 
rights, the Whigs urged that “Federal and State Governments are 
parts of one system, alike necessary for the common prosperity, peace 
and security, and ought to be regarded alike with a cordial, habitual 
and immovable attachment.”30
Republicans likewise articulated a constitutional vision.  The first 
resolution of their first national platform said that the Constitution 





 25. Id. at 77. 
  The implication was clear: unlike Democrats 
who insisted the Constitution protected slavery, Republicans would 
interpret the Constitution in light of the Declaration’s affirmation 
that governments are established to protect natural rights.  Republi-
cans likewise stated their key political promise in constitutional terms: 
that the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign powers over 
the territories of the United States for their government; and that in 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 20. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. “That the maintenance of the principles promulgated in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, and embodied in the Federal Constitution are essential to the preservation of 
our Republican institutions, and that the Federal Constitution, the rights of the States, and 
the union of the States, must and shall be preserved.”  Id. at 27. 
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the exercise of this power, it is both the right and the imperative duty 
of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbar-
ism—polygamy and slavery.32
Like the Whigs before them, the Republicans declared that con-
gressional appropriations promoting transportation and communica-
tions “are authorized by the Constitution, and justified by the obliga-
tion of the Government to protect the lives and property of its 
citizens.”
   
33
The 1860 Republican platform echoed the constitutional prin-
ciples of 1856, but conceded “the right of each state to order and con-
trol its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment ex-
clusively.”
  In all, Republicans cited the Constitution in six of the 
eight resolutions issued by their first national convention.   
34  It added a new constitutional argument to justify banning 
slavery in the territories: “that ‘no persons should be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law.’”  It was the Republi-
can Party’s “duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is neces-
sary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts 
to violate it . . . .”35
In an era when people voted for parties rather than candidates, 




III.  THE COURTS IN AN ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
  From the era of the American Revolution at least 
through the era of Reconstruction, all politics were constitutional pol-
itics. 
Note that in their 1860 platform, Republicans avowed that it was 
the responsibility of Congress to pass legislation to assure that no one 
was deprived of liberty without due process of law in the territories.  
They did not mention the courts.37  In the same plank, the Republi-
cans denied “the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, or 
of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of 
the United States.”38
 
 32. Id.  
  No doubt many Republicans believed the courts 
ought to enforce that constitutional limitation on federal power.  
 33. Id. at 28. 
 34. Id. at 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Michael Les Benedict, The Party Going Strong: Congressional Elections in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century (1981), reprinted in PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS ON POLITICS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA 47, 51–56 (2006). 
 37. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note 24, at 32.  
 38. Id. 
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However, there was no prospect that courts would do so as long as 
Democrats remained in political power.  To the contrary, in Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, the Supreme Court held that Congress was bound to pro-
tect the right of Americans to bring slaves into federal territory.39
Republicans took a similar position with regard to the second 
holding in Dred Scott, that African-Americans were not citizens of the 
United States.  Sumner manifested Republican attitude when the 
black citizenship issue arose in 1864. “I take it that each branch of the 
Government can interpret the Constitution for itself,” he said.  “I 
think that Congress is as good an authority in its interpretation as the 
Supreme Court, and I hope that Congress, in its legislation, will pro-
ceed absolutely without any respect to a decision which has already 
disgraced the country and which ought to be expelled from its juri-
sprudence.”
  
Everyone understood that the plank meant that Republicans intended 
to carry out their interpretation of the Constitution by continuing to 
pass legislation to bar slavery in the territories, no matter what the 
Supreme Court said, and to place on the Court Justices who agreed 
with their interpretation.   
40
Judicial review plays a powerful role in today’s constitutional poli-
tics, but it played a more ambiguous role in the nineteenth-century 
constitutional system.  The Supreme Court and judges of the lower 
federal courts had regularly claimed the power to refuse to apply 
congressional laws that they found inconsistent with the Constitution, 
but they had done so mainly while upholding them and often in deci-
sions that went unreported.
 
41  And in no case before Dred Scott did the 
Supreme Court exercise judicial review in a way that would “create 
significant obstacles to the policies strongly favored by dominant po-
litical actors at the time.”42
Modern jurisprudents treat the Supreme Court’s 1803 opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison
   
43 as the definitive statement of its final authority to 
interpret the Constitution.  In that opinion the Court boldly claimed 
that it was “emphatically the duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”44
 
 39. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856).   
  Comparing acts of Congress to the Constitution 
 40. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1363 (1864).  The issue arose during debate on 
a bill to establish territorial government in Montana.  
 41.  Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 
1257 (2009). 
 42. Id. at 1308.  Whittington, the analyst who made this observation, has most closely 
detailed early instances of judicial review. 
 43. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 44. Id. at 163. 
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was “of the very essence of judicial duty.”45  But the Court’s actual 
conduct at the time had belied its claim.  At the time, Marbury was 
considered a threat to rule key Jeffersonian Republican legislation 
unconstitutional.46  When push came to shove, however, the Court 
had backed down.47  In the words of one analyst, the result left Mar-
bury little more than “a bold but empty assertion of judicial power.”48  
As a result, for most of the nineteenth century Marbury was known on-
ly as a minor case involving jurisdiction.  Only when the Supreme 
Court began to assert primary authority to interpret the Constitution 
in the late nineteenth century did it cite Marbury as authority for judi-
cial review as we know it.49
The constitutionality of federal legislation also arose when state 
laws were challenged as inconsistent with federal laws or provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution.  A completely deferential Court might have as-
sumed the constitutionality of federal laws and limited itself to judg-
ing whether the challenged state laws were compatible with them.  In-
stead, the Court considered the constitutionality of the federal law as 
part of its assessment, most famously in McCulloch v. Maryland
   
50 and in 
cases where state “personal liberty laws” were said to conflict with the 
federal Fugitive Slave Act.51  In the process of considering the consti-
tutionality of state laws, some Justices took the opportunity to interp-
ret U.S. constitutional provisions, especially the Interstate Commerce 
Clause, in ways that implied limits on federal power.52
 
 45. Id. at 178. 
  Yet as of 1865 
 46. The legislation in question was the Jeffersonian Republican repeal of the Judiciary 
Act of 1801, passed by their Federalist opponents to entrench Federalist judges in the fed-
eral court system.  The question was whether the Supreme Court would rule it unconstitu-
tional.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 147–98 (2005); LAWRENCE 
GOLDSTONE, THE ACTIVIST: JOHN MARSHALL, MARBURY V. MADISON, AND THE MYTH OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 224–30 (2008).   
 47. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
 48. Michael W. McConnell, The Story of Marbury v. Madison: Making Defeat Look Like 
Victory, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 1, 31 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
 49. Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a 
“Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003). 
 50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 51. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 506 (1859). 
 52. See, e.g., New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 
U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 460 (1841) (Taney, J., dissenting). 
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the Court had never held a congressional enactment unconstitutional 
in a case testing the constitutionality of a state statute.53
The Supreme Court took a somewhat more active role in protect-
ing rights against state infringement.  It did so particularly when those 
rights arose directly from the U.S. Constitution, federal laws, or trea-
ties, and especially when the Constitution explicitly barred a state ac-
tion, such as the impairment of contracts.
   
54  These decisions really 
were about federalism.  The issue was which rule governed—state or 
federal—rather than the protection of rights against government in 
general.  The Court carefully eschewed broadening its authority to 
protect individual rights against state actions by holding in Barron v. 
Baltimore that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern-
ment.55
Nor were state courts a primary forum for the security of liberty.  
By the mid-nineteenth century, state courts had successfully claimed 
the power of judicial review, primarily when state legislatures had at-
tempted to interfere with judicial proceedings, to reverse decisions, to 
deny access to courts, or to shift legal proceedings to other forums—
violations of what we would now call procedural due process of law.
  
56  
Courts were most aggressive when laws impaired the obligation of a 
contract in violation of the express prohibition in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.57  In a few cases, other offending statutes were said to deprive 
victims of property without due process of law.58
 
 53. Whittington, supra note 
  But while pregnant 
41, at 1270–1325.  The Court did rule on constitutional 
principles that congressional efforts to limit state discretion through provisions of acts ad-
mitting them to statehood were not legally enforceable.  Id. at 1314–15. 
 54. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (law repealing grant of land to in-
vestors impairs a contract in violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution); 
Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813) (state law confiscating 
estates of  Revolutionary Era Tories held inconsistent with U.S. Treaty of Paris ending the 
Revolutionary War); Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (state 
alteration of a college charter impairs the contract embodied in the original charter in 
violation of the Obligation of Contracts Clause). 
 55. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).  
 56. See Donald F. Melhorn, Jupiter’s Sons: Greene County’s Citizen Judges and the Sweeping 
Resolution, 1810–1814, in 1 THE HISTORY OF OHIO LAW 238, 238–66 (Michael Les Benedict 
& John F. Winkler eds., 2004); DONALD F. MELHORN, LEST WE BE MARSHALL’D: JUDICIAL 
POWERS AND POLITICS IN OHIO, 1806–1812 (2003) (describing conflicts over judicial review 
in early nineteenth century Ohio); JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL 
DEPENDENCE IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE (2009).  See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, 
THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).  For the 
close link between procedural due process and early instances of judicial review, see Ed-
ward S. Corwin’s classic, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 366, 370–73 (1911). 
 57. Id. at 379–80. 
 58. Id. at 381. 
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with implications for the future, before the Civil War these instances 
were rare and confined mainly to New York’s singularly aggressive ju-
diciary.59  Courts also energetically protected the rights of criminal 
defendants in court, but as a matter of adhering to common law rules 
rather than constitutional law.60
Thus, as of 1865 neither the state nor the federal courts had 
played an important role in protecting constitutional rights generally 
against infringements by the other branches of government.  An in-
dependent judiciary was recognized as essential to liberty, not because 
it protected individuals or minorities against the tyranny of the major-
ity but because it guaranteed nonpartisan enforcement of the laws 
whatever they were.  With the exceptions noted above, there was no 
tradition of going to court to challenge infringements of civil rights 
on constitutional grounds.  In Barron, the Supreme Court had expli-
citly rejected the idea that state actions could be challenged for violat-
ing the Bill of Rights,
  
61 and until Dred Scott, when Chief Justice Taney 
held that barring slavery in the territories deprived southern slave-
holders of property without due process of law, it had never struck 
down a federal law for doing so.62
In such an environment, assuring that public policy accorded 
with constitutional principles inevitably fell to the political branches 
and thus the American people themselves.  The Constitution’s pur-
pose was to guide more than it was to proscribe.  As Lemuel Shaw, the 
great chief justice of Massachusetts’s supreme court put it, “The 
proper province of a declaration of rights and constitution of gov-
ernment . . . is to declare great principles and fundamental truths, to 
influence and direct the judgment and conscience of legislators in 
making laws, rather than to limit and control them, by directing what 
precise laws they shall make.”
  
63
As Sumner’s blast at the Court, quoted above, indicated, in an 
era of such judicial restraint, Americans did not consider judicial in-
terpretations of the Constitution to bind the people or the other 
branches of government.  Government officers were bound to en-
force courts’ specific decisions, but they were not bound to agree with 
 
 
 59. Id. at 377–79. 
 60. See Michael Les Benedict, Civil Liberty in Ohio, in 2 The HISTORY OF OHIO LAW, su-
pra note 56, at 695–700, for a discussion of the rubrics under which courts protected de-
fendants’ rights in Ohio. 
 61. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
 62. David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the 
Admission of Maryland’s First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 974 (1985). 
 63. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206–07 (1849).  For further ela-
boration of this point, see DINAN, supra note 22, at 14–22. 
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their constitutional reasoning or to treat that reasoning as determina-
tive of public policy.  No one who lived through the Jacksonian Era 
could have thought that the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions 
bound either the people or their representatives in the political 
branches.  The Court’s decisions sustained the constitutional natio-
nalism endorsed by the Federalist party, the nationalist wing of the 
Jeffersonian Republican party, and the Whigs.  But Jacksonian Demo-
crats gained and kept power by advocating state rights and strict con-
struction of federal power.  They destroyed the National Bank, ended 
protective tariffs, and repudiated a national system of internal im-
provements.64  Republicans felt no hesitation about repudiating the 
Taney Court’s proslavery constitutionalism.  Citing Supreme Court 
opinions might have strengthened a constitutional argument made in 
Congress or presented on the stump, but they were hardly determina-
tive.  The universal denunciation with which Republicans reacted to 
the Dred Scott decision reflected their conviction that the authority to 
interpret the Constitution in the end lay with the people, not the 
Court.65
As Larry Kramer demonstrated for the founding era and early 
republic, and John J. Dinan illustrated for the rest of the nineteenth 
century, the responsibility for protecting rights lay with the people 
themselves through the political system.
   
66
 
 64. Thus Professor Currie explained in his preface to the volume on constitutional 
disputes between Jacksonian Democrats and Whigs in Congress:  
  Antislavery lawyers and pol-
iticians like Salmon P. Chase had turned to the courts to challenge the 
grossest federal assault on liberty, the Fugitive Slave Act, and also to 
argue that setting foot on free territory permanently freed a slave.  
But it is very unlikely they expected to win.  The courts proved a po-
werful forum for making a constitutional argument to the American 
people, especially in the days before antislavery advocates secured 
The central theme of the present volume is . . . the determined and ultimately 
successful effort of a succession of largely Democratic Presidents and their con-
gressional allies to limit federal intervention in the economy, whether in the 
form of support for internal improvements, maintenance of a National Bank, es-
tablishment of protective tariffs, or disposition of the public lands. 
CURRIE, supra note 11, at xii. 
 65. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS 417–18 (1978).   
 66. KRAMER, supra note 23, at 3–8; DINAN, supra note 22, at 60.  I think Dinan underes-
timates the degree to which a “judicialist” regime was developing at the turn of the twen-
tieth century—the period he identifies as the “populist” regime.  See id. at 116.  I also want 
to distinguish between Kramer and Dinan’s factual observations about popular constitu-
tionalism and their normative proposition, explicit or implicit, that popular constitutional-
ism should constrain and limit judicial review.  As a historian, I am concerned only with 
the former and take no position on the latter. 
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election to Congress.  Chase’s legal arguments became the founda-
tion for the constitutional argument the Republican Party made to 
the people, and he himself continued to articulate them as a United 
States senator and then as governor of Ohio.67
Take, for example, one of the better known cases in which anti-
slavery advocates turned to the courts for succor.  In Roberts v. City of 
Boston, Benjamin Roberts and his lawyers Charles Sumner and Robert 
Morris challenged Boston’s segregated school system.
   
68  They argued 
that the local school board’s state-sanctioned refusal to admit Ro-
berts’s daughter Sarah to an all-white public school violated the provi-
sion of the Massachusetts state constitution that declared all persons 
equal before the law.69  As happened elsewhere when African-
Americans challenged statutory or administrative discrimination, the 
Massachusetts supreme court dismissed the suit.70  It was not up to the 
courts to overturn state laws based on general declarations of rights.  
Chief Justice Shaw explained, “[A]ll those rights of individuals which 
can be asserted and maintained in any judicial tribunal . . . depend 
upon the provisions of law.”71  It was in this opinion that Shaw articu-
lated the prescriptive rather than proscriptive nature of constitutions 
in language worth repeating: “The proper province of a declaration 
of rights and constitution of government . . . is to declare great prin-
ciples and fundamental truths, to influence and direct the judgment 
and conscience of legislators in making laws, rather than to limit and 
control them, by directing what precise laws they shall make.”72
Shaw’s understanding had a clear implication for the role of the 
judiciary, made concrete in the Roberts case.  If the Constitution were 
held to “limit and control” legislatures “by directing what precise laws 
they shall make,” courts would be compelled to enforce the limitation 
and exercise the control.
   
73
 
 67. See Jules Lobel, A Tradition of Resistance: Antislavery Litigators and the Fight for Freedom, 
in JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 46, 50–65 (2003) (discussing Chase’s efforts in court). 
  That was what Roberts, Sumner, Morris, 
and other opponents of racial segregation in the schools had asked 
the Massachusetts courts to do, and that was the invitation that Shaw 
declined. 
 68. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 198, 200–01 (1849). 
 69. Id. at 200–01. 
 70. Id. at 210. 
 71. Id. at 206.   
 72. Id. at 206–07.  For further elaboration on this point, see DINAN, supra note 22, at 
14–22. 
 73. Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 206–07. 
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What followed illustrated Shaw’s proposition as well as the role of 
constitutional politics in protecting constitutional rights.  Making the 
same arguments they had directed to the courts, in 1855 opponents of 
segregation secured a law barring school boards from denying admis-
sion to students on racial grounds, thus desegregating schools 
throughout Massachusetts.74
During the congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Sumner would move to substitute different words for what be-
came its familiar, final language.  He proposed that the Amendment 
read: “All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can 
hold another as a slave,” along with an explicit delegation of power to 
enforce the declaration.
  Viewed from a long-term perspective, 
Sumner and Morris’s recourse to the courts should be seen as part of 
a persistent political effort to end school segregation, rather than a 
judicial alternative to it.   
75
In sum, when Congress proposed and the state legislatures rati-
fied the Thirteenth Amendment, they did not conceive that the 
courts would be the primary agency that would enforce it.  They ex-
pected it to be enforced through the political process.  An application 
to the courts might be part of that political process, but it would not 
be an alternative to it.   
  The utility of the Massachusetts constitu-
tion’s equality provision in the constitutional politics that had over-
turned Boston’s segregated school system was likely one of the things 
that led him to urge his colleagues to frame the Amendment in simi-
lar terms. 
IV.  THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
The great but very law-oriented constitutional jurisprudent 
Charles Fairman complained that congressional supporters of the 
Thirteenth Amendment spoke with “imprecision” about what consti-
tuted freedom.  Their “heightened language” reflected their exulta-
tion but failed to provide useful legislative history to guide future in-
terpretation.76
 
 74. J. Morgan Kousser, The Supremacy of Equal Rights: The Struggle Against Racial Discrim-
ination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 941, 988–89 (1988); James B. Stewart & George R. Price, The Roberts Case, the Eas-
ton Family, and the Dynamics of the Abolitionist Movement in Massachusetts, 1776–1870, in JAMES 
B. STEWART, ABOLITIONIST POLITICS AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 61, 61–88 (2008).   
  “[I]n construing the amendment, there is need to 
 75. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482–83 (1864).   
 76. CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–1888, at 
1134–35 (1971).  
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distinguish between sanguine prophecies and cold propositions about 
legal consequences,” he wrote.77
Fairman’s criticism would have been appropriate if Americans 
had been concerned primarily with the Amendment’s impact on con-
stitutional law.  But Republicans expected the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to affect future constitutional politics.  From that standpoint, 
the “heightened language” that Fairman dismissed was more relevant 
than the “cold propositions” of law that he would have preferred.  
Republicans did not address the precise meaning of freedom because 
that was not the constitutional issue before the American people.  
With rare exceptions,
  
78 Democratic opponents did not attack the 
proposed Amendment for the rights it might have promised the 
emancipated slaves.79  Democrats articulated bitterly racist arguments 
on the stump and in other congressional debates, but the few refer-
ences to race in the Amendment debates were mild.  The Amend-
ment “utterly ignores the greatest evil of slavery . . . in completely de-
basing the subject of it and making him unfit either to be a good 
citizen or a good man,” was as far as one opponent went, for exam-
ple.80  No congressman expressed opposition to the Amendment on 
account of the constitutional rights it might secure to those it freed, 
nor did any proponent try to catalogue them.  Even Maryland’s Re-
verdy Johnson, the great constitutional lawyer, eschewed the question 
as he surprised Democrats with a forceful argument in favor of the 
Amendment.81
 
 77. Id. 
  Democrats only offered one amendment making race 
 78. For one exception, see the warning of Indiana’s Democratic Representative Wil-
liam S. Holman, who said that freedom implied participation in government and thus 
African-American suffrage, without charging Republicans with the intent to enfranchise 
freedmen.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864).  Indiana Democrat Joseph K. 
Edgerton was not so charitable.  Id. at 2987 (1864). 
 79. It seems remarkable that Democrats did not demand that Republicans define what 
the status of freed slaves would be, thus playing to the white racism that might have de-
railed emancipation.  Although Democratic opponents of the Amendment often referred 
to African-Americans in racist terms, only three of them either challenged Republicans to 
articulate the future status of the freed people or suggested that emancipation implied 
equal rights: Representative William S. Holman (D-Ind.), id. at 2962 (1864); Robert Mal-
lory (D-Ky.), id. at 2982–83 (1864);  Joseph K. Edgerton, (D-Ind.) id. at 2987 (1864).  It is 
less surprising that Republicans, knowing the depth of racism even in the North, did not 
volunteer the information. 
 80. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 527 (1865) (Rep. Brown, D-Wis.). 
 81. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1422–24 (1864) (Unionist-Md.).  Elected to the 
Senate as a Whig, Johnson supported Democrat Stephen A. Douglas for president in 1860.  
Although he is identified as a “unionist” in the 38th Congress (1863–1865), he generally 
cooperated with Democrats in the Senate, although he broke with them to support the 
Thirteenth Amendment.  By the 39th Congress (1865–1867) the Congressional Directory 
identified him as a Democrat.  See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
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an issue—a proposition to substitute for the whole amendment a con-
stitutional provision declaring that no Negro should be a citizen nor 
be eligible to hold any civil or military office.82  No one debated it, 
and it was defeated overwhelmingly, with Johnson voting against it 
even though he had been Sanford’s lawyer in the Dred Scott case and 
despite the fact that only a few hours earlier, debating another meas-
ure, he had said that case had settled African-Americans’ status.83
Instead, Democrats attacked the Amendment as the emblem of a 
new constitutional order.  They insisted that “the protection which 
the Constitution threw around the slavery system of the South . . . was 
in fact the very bond of our Union,”
 
84 and they feared that the 
Amendment abolishing slavery would make “a virtually new Constitu-
tion.”85 For Democrats, it was a question of “whether we shall alter the 
whole structure and theory of government by changing the basis upon 
which it rests.”86
The Amendment marked a revolutionary intrusion into the right 
of the states to order their domestic relations.  One Democrat com-
mented: “It is in conflict with the principles on which the Union was 
originally formed, and with the whole theory and spirit of the Consti-
tution as to the rights of the States.”
   
87
carries a general principle which is as hostile to other pecu-
liarly local and State institutions and interests as to sla-
very. . . . If this proposed alteration of the Constitution be 
accepted it will be a precedent, and may establish a principle 
that may carry those other domestic concerns . . . into the 
domain of an encroaching and centralized despotism.
  It may be limited to slavery, 
said Kentucky’s Senator Garrett Davis, but it  
88
Indiana Democrat Joseph K. Edgerton urged: “[The Amend-
ment] might as well propose that freedom of religious opinion should 
be abolished,” or regulate marriage, or “regulate the relations of par-
   
 
CONGRESS, 1774–PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
 82. The Senate voted on the amendment twice.  CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1370 (1864); id. at 1424 (1864). 
 83. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1370 (1864).  Johnson had explicitly declared 
that African-Americans were not citizens while debating a bill creating a territorial gov-
ernment in Montana.  Id. at 1362–63 (1864).   
 84. Id. at 2616 (1864) (Rep. Herrick, D-N.Y.). 
 85. Id. at 2615 (emphasis in original). 
 86. Id. at 2940 (1864) (Rep. Fernando Wood, D-N.Y.). 
 87. Id. at 2986 (1864) (Rep. Edgerton, D-Ind.). 
 88. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 104, 106 (1864).  
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ent and child, or the canons of property, or the elective franchise.”89  
“The principle of the proposed amendment is the principle of consol-
idation,” and its passage would be “a final subversion of our constitu-
tional Government,” he said.  In Edgerton’s opinion, it was 
“[b]etter . . . for our country, better for man, that negro slavery exist a 
thousand years than that American white men lose their constitution-
al liberty in the extinction of the constitutional sovereignty of the 
Federal States of this Union.”90
For some Democrats, like the Copperhead Fernando Wood, the 
issue went beyond federalism into the relationship between govern-
ment and civil liberty in general.  The Constitution created a Union 
“for certain specified objects,” he insisted, “none of them relating to 
or affecting in any manner individual or personal interests in those 
things which touch the domestic concerns.”
 
91  The Amendment 
would bring federal power to bear on what Wood and like-minded 
Democrats considered a domestic institution of the same sort as mar-
riage, religious belief, private property, “and all matters purely so-
cial.”92  It reflected “the idea which has been derived from despotism 
and the notions of feudal powers that Governments are omnipotent, 
and draw within their sphere all that belongs to the individual, even 
the liberty of thought, speech, and conscience,” he warned.93
Because the change was so profound, Democrats argued that the 
Amendment exceeded the power of constitutional amendment itself.  
The power to amend the Constitution was limited “by the idea which 
underlies it all as a foundation,” posited Ohio’s influential Democrat-
ic Representative George W. Pendleton.
  
94
It never was the purpose of those who made [the Constitu-
tion] to subject many of its great principles to be expunged 
by the exercise of this power of amendment. . . .  [T]here is 
a boundary between the power of revolution and the power 
of amendment, which the latter . . . cannot pass; and that if 
  Kentucky’s Senator Garrett 
Davis likewise insisted:  
 
 89. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2986, 2987 (1864). 
 90. Id.  See also id. at 2991 (1864) (Rep. Randall, D-Pa.); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 219 (1865) (Rep. Holman, D-Ind.); id. at 242 (1865) (Rep. Cox, D-Ohio), id. at 481 
(1865) (Rep. Finck, D-Ohio). 
 91. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2940 (1864) (Rep. Fernando Wood, D-N.Y.). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1865). 
BenedictFinal BookProof 12/7/2011  10:19 AM 
180 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:163 
the proposed change is revolutionary it would be null and 
void notwithstanding it might be formally adopted.95
Another Democrat in the House of Representatives asked, 
“[W]hat safety there would be in a Republic like this if three fourths 
of the States could deprive the other fourth of those rights, jurisdic-
tion over which was not delegated by the States to the General Gov-
ernment?” and added,  “Would not the whole framework of the Gov-
ernment be thereby overthrown?”
   
96
the marital rights, the rights of husband and wife, of parent 
and child, of master and servants; the right of licensing ho-
tels, the right of making private contracts, the rights of 
courts . . . the rights of suffrage for State officers, constitu-
tions of States and all the rights which now belong to the 
States, upon the same principle may be interfered with, ab-
olished, and annulled.
  That limit applied to all the areas 
of jurisdiction the original Constitution reserved to the states, he 
made clear.  No constitutional amendment could touch state jurisdic-
tion. Otherwise 
97
Precisely one Democrat had so exalted a view of judicial power as 
to suggest that courts might nullify the proposed Amendment.
   
98  Da-
vis may have implied something similar when he said the Amendment 
would be “null and void.”99
 
 95. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. App. 104, 106 (1864).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366–67 (1864) (Sen. Saulsbury, D-Del.) (arguing against the 
Amendment on the theory that the Constitution should not allow three-fourths of the 
states to deprive citizens in the other states of property rights); id. at 1458 (1864) (Sen. 
Hendricks, D-Ind.) (arguing that abolition goes beyond the legitimate power of amend-
ment because slavery predated the Constitution and was “an institution of the colonies”); 
id. at 2939 (1864) (Rep. Pruyn, D-N.Y.) (arguing the Amendment is outside the scope of 
the original Constitution and therefore invalid); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 
(1865) (Rep. C.A. White, D-Ohio) (arguing the Constitution can be amended only in ways 
consistent with the original document and not to “supplement” it with new provisions “dis-
connected” with an existing grant of power). 
  No other Democrat even hinted at such a 
possibility.  With a presidential election looming, Democrats were ad-
dressing their arguments to the people, not to future generations of 
lawyers and judges.  “[I]f we intend to secure to ourselves the impe-
rishable boon to speak, to act as a free people, and to enjoy liberty 
and preserve our rights, we must retrace our steps to a strict obser-
 96. Id. at 152 (1865) (Rep. Rogers, D-N.J.). 
 97. Id. at 151 (1865) (Rep. Rogers, D-N.J.).  
 98. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 523 (1865) (Rep. Coffroth, D-Pa.).  A lone Re-
publican seemed to agree that the Supreme Court might consider the question.  Id. at 482 
(1865) (Rep. Starr, R-N.J.). 
 99. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 106 (1864) (Sen. Davis, D-Ky.). 
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vance of the laws and the Constitution,” one such Democrat urged.  
“The question is with the people to decide.”100
Democratic opponents of the Amendment expected the people 
to sustain them and their constitutional arguments in the congres-
sional and presidential elections of 1864.
   
101  Those were the argu-
ments Republicans had to answer and the people were the judges they 
had to address.  Republicans responded by lambasting the proslavery 
constitutional order Democrats had imposed on the nation and by re-
counting the inhumane legal rules necessary to maintain it.  When 
Democrats denounced the proposed amendment for depriving sou-
therners of property rights, a New York Republican sputtered sarcasti-
cally, “I have never until this morning understood to its full and per-
fect extent the definition of civil liberty.”  He had learned from the 
opponents of the Amendment “that civil liberty consists in the right of 
one people to enslave another people . . . .”102  He denied it: “Nature 
made all men free, and entitled them to equal rights before the law; 
and this Government of ours must stand upon this principle . . . .”103
In place of a constitutional order that exalted the property rights 
of slave owners, the Amendment would re-establish a constitutional 
order dedicated to freedom, which Republicans insisted the Framers 
had intended and slave owners had subverted.  The Constitution was 
ordained and established to secure the blessings of liberty.  Slavery 
“pervert[ed] its end and aim!”  New Hampshire’s Republican Senator 
Daniel Clark lamented.
   
104  “[T]his is not a mere struggle between the 
North and the South; it is a conflict between two systems,” a Republi-
can representative observed.105
The Thirteenth Amendment turned upon the question of 
whether the United States would be “a nation of freemen or slaves.”
   
106  
Its ratification, said New Hampshire Republican Senator John P. Hale, 
would mark the day  when Americans would finally live up to “the sub-
lime truths which their fathers uttered years ago and which have 
slumbered dead letters upon the pages of our Constitution.”107
 
 100. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2954 (1864) (Rep. Coffroth, D-Pa.). 
  “The 
America of the past is gone forever,” another Republican affirmed: “A 
 101. Id. at 2951 (1864) (Rep. Marcy, D-N.H.); id. at 2958 (1864) (Rep. Ross, D-Ill.). 
 102. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1865) (Rep. Davis, R-N.Y.). 
 103. Id. 
 104. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1368–69 (1864).  For similar views, see id. at 
2943 (1864) (Rep. Higby, R-Cal.); id. at 2949 (1864) (Rep. Shannon, R-Cal.). 
 105. Id. at 2615 (1864) (Rep. Daniel Morris, R-N.Y.). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1443 (1864) (Sen. Hale, R-N.H.). 
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new nation is to be born from the agony through which the people 
are now passing. . . .  Let us now, to-day, in the name of liberty, justice, 
and of God, consummate this grand revolution.  Let us to-day make 
our country, our whole country, the home of the free.”108
Republicans identified “true national greatness” with “[s]mall 
farms, small towns, manufacturing communities and villages, rather 
than cities or large estates.”
 
109  “To each of these slavery is in antagon-
ism,” they insisted.  It “rolls back the car of civilization, and brings us 
once more into the feudal age . . . .  With it the statesmanship that la-
bors to secure ‘the greatest good to the greatest number’ is inverted, 
and the greatest good to the smallest number is substituted.”110  Op-
pressive as slavery was for black slaves, it was almost as oppressive for 
poor, non-slaveholding whites.  The Amendment would “elevate and 
disinthrall [sic] that most injured and dependent class of our fellow 
white men from their downtrodden and degraded condition, that 
they too may be men, and enjoy the independence and rights of 
manhood.”111
Republicans associated such a free society with prosperity and 
progress.  Managing the Amendment through the House in 1865, 
Ohio’s James M. Ashley eschewed presenting “an array of facts and 
figures” to demonstrate the superiority of free over slave labor.
   
112  “All 
thinking men have examined and comprehend the priceless value of 
free labor,” he said.  Pass the Amendment “and the free-laboring men 
of the North and of Europe will flock to the South.”113  Add the value 
of emancipated black labor, “and you have a free-labor force 
which . . . will make the land to blossom like the rose.”114  Republicans 
contrasted the prosperity and progress of the free North and West 
with the poverty and inertia of the South,115
 
 108. Id. at 2989 (1864) (Rep. Arnold, R-Ill.) (emphasis in original).  See Representative 
Godlove S. Orth’s similar language:  
 to which a flabbergasted 
The nation is being born again, and from the fire and smoke of battle, from its 
death groans of agony, . . . the American Republic will emerge wiser, better, pur-
er, and more powerful. . . .  We are to develop, to mature, to protect every ener-
gy, every sentiment, every aspiration in man’s nature, to secure to him every nat-
ural right, to demonstrate to the world his capacity for civil, social religious, 
mental, and physical enjoyment. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1865) (Rep. Orth, R-Ind.). 
 109. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2948 (1864) (Rep. Shannon, R-Cal.). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 (1865). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2979 (1864) (Rep. Farnsworth, R-Ill.).        
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Democrat queried, “How long . . . is it since it was discovered that the 
country could not prosper under our Constitution?”116  The argument 
that the Thirteenth Amendment was necessary to secure national 
prosperity “is either a crazy delusion or a wicked and willful false-
hood,” so inane “that to me it seems almost absurd to attempt serious-
ly to refute it.”117
Republicans dismissed the proposition that some fundamental 
principle of the Constitution precluded an amendment abolishing 
slavery.  “[T]he question . . . seems to be simply this: can we amend 
the Constitution in the way in which the Constitution itself says it may 
be amended?” one bemused Republican observed.
 
118  There could be 
no doubt of Congress’s power to submit the Amendment—“[u]nless 
the Constitution be itself unconstitutional.”119 Article V of the Consti-
tution, which specified how it could be amended, is “just as full of vi-
tality as it was the day our fathers established it as a part of the Consti-
tution of this country,” declaimed yet another Republican.120  They 
turned state-sovereignty arguments against their proponents, pointing 
out that “[t]here is nowhere contemplated in the Constitution of the 
United States any action . . . that more completely acknowledges and 
recognizes State sovereignty than this very provision of the Constitu-
tion explaining how it may be amended.”121
Of course, most Republicans repudiated Democratic notions of 
state sovereignty.  Sovereignty lay in the American people, they in-
sisted: 
   
Upon what ground . . . are the people of the United States 
to be told that they cannot, if they choose, improve the fun-
damental law of their Government? . . .  [T]his is a matter 
for the people of the United States.  We are not amending 
the Constitution . . . .  We propose . . . to afford the people 
the opportunity of amending their Constitution if they see 
proper to exercise that power.122
 
 116. Id. at 2946 (1864) (Rep. Kalbfleisch, D-N.Y.). 
   
 117. Id. 
 118. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1865) (Rep. Jenckes, R-R.I.). 
 119. Id. at 216 (1865) (Rep. Smithers, Unconditional Unionist-Del.). 
 120. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2943 (1864) (Rep. Higby, R-Cal.). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2980 (1864) (Rep. Thayer, R-Pa.).  See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 
142 (1865) (Rep. Orth, R-Ind.) (“Congress cannot amend the Constitution. . . .  [W]e, by 
our action here, simply authorize the people to determine for themselves whether they will 
ratify or reject the proposed amendment.”); id. at 485 (1865) (Rep. Morris, R-N.Y.) (“The 
States have delegated nothing to the General Government.  The General Government is 
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Although many Republicans scouted any limitation upon the 
amending power beyond the two expressly mentioned in Article V,123 
others conceded that there must be some limitations, no doubt re-
cognizing the power of Democratic arguments that the Thirteenth 
Amendment might set a precedent for amending away fundamental 
civil liberties.  Congressman Ashley of Ohio held that the Constitution 
could be modified by “any amendment, republican in its character 
and consistent with the continued existence of the nation.”124
[A]n amendment which tends to “a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, to insure domestic tranquility, to provide 
for the common defense, to promote the general welfare, 
and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our 
posterity,” is an amendment which, when made according to 
the form prescribed in the Constitution, is both morally and 
legally binding upon the people of the country.
  George 
S. Boutwell took a similar position, opining that Constitutional 
amendments must be consistent with the preamble’s statement of the 
purposes for which the Constitution was framed.  To that end, he 
stated, 
125
Obviously, the Thirteenth Amendment satisfied every count. 
  
Ashley used the issue to discredit the “fatal heresy” that linked 
state rights to state sovereignty.  The limits Democrats placed on the 
power to amend the Constitution made “the States sovereign, the 
Government a confederation, and the United States not a nation.”  
That version of state rights was “at war with the fundamental prin-
ciples of the Constitution,” and led directly to the rebellion.  “To 
thinking men nothing seems more absurd than the political heresy 
called States rights in the sense which makes each State sovereign and 
the national Government the mere agent and creature of the 
States.”126
 
not the creature of the States, but of an entire people.  The people established a Constitu-
tion, and provided therein for amendments thereto.”). 
  Ashley continued with a long, thorough exposition of the 
 123. Article V barred an amendment to the Constitution that would modify the provi-
sions of Article IX that delayed until 1808 Congress’s authority to pass a law abolishing the 
slave trade or levying a direct tax on slaves.  Article V still precludes amending the Consti-
tution to deprive any state of equal representation in the Senate without its consent.  See 
U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thou-
sand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the 
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived 
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
 124. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1865) (Rep. Ashley, R-Ohio).   
 125. Id. at 222–23 (1865) (Rep. Boutwell, R-Mass.). 
 126. Id. at 139 (1865) (Rep. Ashley, R-Ohio). 
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nationalist interpretation of the origins of the Constitution, conclud-
ing: 
It is past comprehension how any man with the Constitution 
before him, and this history of the convention which formed 
that Constitution within his reach, together with the re-
peated decisions of the Supreme Court against the assump-
tion of the State rights pretensions, can be found at this late 
day defending the State sovereignty dogmas, and claiming 
that the national constitution cannot be so amended as to 
prohibit slavery . . . .127
As Michael Vorenberg stated, Republicans “saw in the amend-
ment an issue that they could use to define themselves against the 
Democrats in the upcoming elections.”
 
128  And, as had been the case 
throughout the antebellum years, the partisan distinction was one of 
constitutional philosophy.  Democrats and Republicans presented a 
direct and clear choice to the American people: preserve a chance for 
a restoration of the Union by adhering to the prewar, proslavery Con-
stitution—“the Union as it was, the Constitution as it is,” in the words 
of the Democratic slogan129
In those terms, it made perfect sense for Massachusetts Republi-
can Senator Henry Wilson to “exult” that the Amendment “will oblite-
rate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, de-
grading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all 
it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it, from the 
face of the nation,” and to predict that “the nation, ‘regenerated and 
disinthralled by the genius of universal emancipation,’ will run the ca-
reer of development, power, and glory, quickened, animated, and 
—or commit to a war to reconstruct the 
Union on the basis of freedom. 
 
 127. Id.; see also id. at 482–85 (1865) (Rep. Patterson, R-N.H.) (noting that states “were 
never supreme and unlimited in their sovereignty” and describing “the privileges which 
belong to the national Government”).  
 128. MICHAEL VORENBERG, supra note 14, at 90 (emphasis in original). 
 129. See The Union as It Was, and the Constitution as It Is, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1864 (“Look 
at the front of Tammany Hall, or at almost any of the Copperhead banners swung over the 
street, and you see beneath the Janus-faced portraits of MCCLELLAN and PENDLETON, 
the inscription—‘The Union as it was, and the Constitution as it is.’”).  For the way the slo-
gan summarized the Democratic constitutional argument, see JEAN H. BAKER, AFFAIRS OF 
PARTY: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF NORTHERN DEMOCRATS IN THE MID-NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 143–76 (1983) (mentioning the slogan at 152) and JOEL H. SILBEY, A 
RESPECTABLE MINORITY: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA, 1860–1868, at 70–
88 (1977) (mentioning the slogan at 87). 
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guided by the spirit of the Christian democracy that ‘pulls not the 
highest down, but lifts the lowest up.’”130
Wilson and his colleagues did not expect the courts to establish 
this new order.  They hoped courts would be a part of it.  But the 
Amendment’s proponents and opponents were engaged in constitu-
tional politics not constitutional law.  Wilson’s prediction precisely re-
flected Shaw’s understanding of constitutionalism.  The antislavery 
principle that the Thirteenth Amendment would incorporate into the 
Constitution would, in Shaw’s words, “influence and direct the judg-
ment and conscience of legislators in making laws, rather than . . . 
limit and control them, by directing what precise laws they shall 
make.”
   
131
This did not mean that Republicans were unconcerned about 
how courts might understand the Amendment.  Sumner hoped 
judges would join the effort to dedicate the nation to freedom, but he 
did not intend to rely on them.  “[O]ne of the saddest chapters in our 
history has been the conduct of judges, who have lent themselves to 
the support of slavery,” he lamented.
   
132  “Injunctions of the Constitu-
tion, guarantees of personal liberty, and prohibitions against its inva-
sion, have all been forgotten.”133  Sumner wanted to include a decla-
ration of equal rights as part of the Amendment in order to establish 
the same principle that had led the people of Massachusetts to ban 
school segregation.  He did not trust courts, a sentiment understand-
able in light of his experience as Roberts’s lawyer.  Michigan Republi-
can Jacob M. Howard, likewise a lawyer and a member of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that framed the Amendment’s language, op-
posed Sumner’s proposal pretty much for the same reason Sumner 
made it.  “[I]n a legal and technical sense that language is utterly in-
significant and meaningless as a clause of the Constitution,” he ad-
monished his colleague.134
 
 130. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).  Likewise Republican Illinois Rep-
resentative Ebon Ingersoll’s expectation that the ratification of the Amendment would 
lead to the establishment of free speech in all the states, that with abolition “school-houses 
will rise upon the ruins of the slave mart, intelligence will take the place of ignorance, 
wealth of poverty, and honor of degradation; industry will go hand in hand with virtue, 
and prosperity with happiness, and a disenthralled and regenerated people will rise up 
and bless you and be an honor to the American Republic.”  Id. at 2990 (1864). 
  “[W]hat effect this would have in law in a 
court of justice?” he asked.  “What significance is given to the phrase 
‘equal’ or ‘free’ before the law in a common-law court?  It is not 
 131. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206–07 (1849). 
 132. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1481 (1864) (Sen. Sumner, R-Mass.). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1488 (1864) (Sen. Howard, R-Mich.). 
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known at all.”135  The Judiciary Committee’s language, on the other 
hand, was drawn from the antislavery provision of the Northwest Or-
dinance, “an expression which has been adjudicated upon repeatedly, 
which is perfectly well understood both by the public and by judicial 
tribunals.”136
Howard was, we can now see, looking toward the future—a fu-
ture in which Americans would rely on courts as the prime protectors 
of constitutional rights.  For that purpose, the language had to be 
precise and to include terms of known legal import.  But at the time, 
Howard was the only Republican in either house of Congress to dis-
cuss how courts might interpret the Thirteenth Amendment.  Exactly 
what freedom meant was an argument for another day, addressed to 
the American people in 1866, after southern states’ legislatures forced 
the issue by passing the Black Codes.  No Republican then suggested 
relying on the courts to decide whether the Black Codes were consis-
tent with the Thirteenth Amendment.  Instead they passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, and took 
the constitutional issue to the people, where it belonged. 
   
V.  CONCLUSION 
What does the difference between the constitutional politics of 
the nineteenth century and the twenty-first century mean for en-
forcement of the Thirteenth Amendment?  The logical outcome of 
the present system of constitutional politics, which recognizes judicial 
priority in construing the Constitution, is the Court’s claim in City of 
Boerne v. Flores137 that the Court alone has the authority to define what 
constitutional provisions mean and the political branches must ac-
quiesce in those determinations.138
 
 135. Id. 
  Should the Supreme Court treat 
the Thirteenth Amendment as an exception, somehow outside the 
present system of constitutional politics, because this is not how its 
framers understood the Court’s role when it was ratified?  Would we, 
constitutional scholars bred in the current system, really favor that?  
After all, the same observation can be made of all earlier constitution-
al amendments and possibly of the Fourteenth as well. 
 136. Id. at 1489. 
 137. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 138. See id. at 536 (“When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted with-
in the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is.” (ci-
tations omitted)).  
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What of a more restrained proposition—that the Supreme Court 
should be more deferential to congressional enforcement of the Thir-
teenth Amendment than it is to state and federal actions that raise 
other constitutional questions?  But, again, why limit this deference to 
the Thirteenth Amendment when all earlier amendments were prod-
ucts of the same system of constitutional politics as it was?   
So perhaps the benefit of revisiting the constitutional politics of 
the nineteenth century is only to remind us that our ancestors lived in 
a significantly different constitutional world, to do what history does 
best—let us know that there have been alternative ways of solving 
human problems, in this case the problem of how to maintain liberty 
in a democratic republic.  Only when we have that kind of knowledge 
can we consider whether the system of constitutional politics in which 
we live today—one that relies on the courts and constitutional law to 
decide constitutional issues rather than the people and constitutional 
politics—does a job better than the one in which our ancestors lived 
150 years ago. 
 
